Masooda Omar Young

My Interview at CNN Studios

2009-12-11T19:55:00.000-08:00

FATA In Peril

2009-12-04T07:18:00.000-08:00

Pakistan has been going through one of its most challenging periods lately, as it tries to defeat homegrown extremists threatening the nation’s stability and challenging the writ of the government. The majority of these militant groups are believed to come from Pakistan’s northwestern areas bordering Afghanistan, also called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Based on a recent report conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations’ Daniel Markey, “FATA is the poorest, least developed part of Pakistan” and “should another 9/11-type attack take place in the United States, it will likely have its origins in this region.”(1) (2008, 3-5). A place where Al Qaeda and the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani) have sought shelter since their retreat from Afghanistan which has made it a target for the US predator drone attacks:

“The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are [sic] located along Pakistan's north-western Hamalaya zone and south-western Sulaiman Mountains and runs as a narrow tract along the river Indus with the parallel lines almost north to south. It consists of seven semi-autonomous agencies or administrative units…This tangled mass…is inhabited by around 3.17 million people belonging to different Pukhtoon or Pushtun [Pashtun] tribes. The 1400 miles long Durand Line, which was drawn in 1893 by the British colonial rulers of India, geographically divides the Pushtun tribes in the region between Afghanistan and [the] FATA of Pakistan. (2) (Understanding FATA 2008)

As a relatively young state, since its conception in 1947, Pakistan has struggled to form strong social/civilian institutions able to lead the country’s national and international affairs. Ahmad Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and expert on South Asian affairs, describes this phenomenon as: “two relationships have dominated the politics of the country: that between the military power and civilian society and the one between Islam and the state” (3) (2008, 33). The current Islamic insurgency in Pakistan’s tribal areas, then, is a direct byproduct of this struggle that has inspired self-defeating policies of Islamization and militarization in FATA that continues to haunt the country.

Nonetheless, the growing threat of Islamic militancy in the tribal areas has been downplayed tremendously by the Pakistan Army because “after Pakistan lost its eastern foothold in 1971 with the independence of Bangladesh…there existed a real fear in Islamabad that India would bolster [the] Pashtun nationalist movement…as a result, Pakistan must…downplay nationalism [and] play up Islamism…” (4) (Pakistan: A New Phase In Militant Proxy Saga 2008).

Besides their constant preoccupation with threats coming from India, Pakistani governments have always viewed the Pashtun tribes of FATA with suspicion and anxiety because there are “…more Pashtuns living inside Pakistan than inside Afghanistan…”. Unsurprisingly, this dynamic promotes a fear that Afghanistan will exploit any opportunity to stir-up nationalist aspirations in Pakistan. Therefore, “A war fought on Islamic principles [was thought to] help…shore up a political base at home and deflect appeals to Pashtun nationalism.” (5) (Coll 2004, 62)

The other major factor that influences policy decisions in Islamabad—the one that Pakistani leaders and politicians have struggled with since the creation of Pakistan—is a national identity crisis. According to Rashid:

“Pakistan emerged from a bloodbath of religious and ethnic hatred and…immediately, the question of Pakistan’s identity arose: was it to be a pluralistic, democratic country for Muslims and other religious minorities or a theocratic Islamic state? Founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah was perfectly clear that Pakistan had to be a secular, democratic state” (2008, 35).

However, Jinnah’s dreams of a “secular and democratic state” were never realized because “for first half of the sixty years of the country’s existence, Pakistanis have lived under four military regimes. Each one has reinvented the wheel by debating whether democracy is possible in an Islamic state…” (Rashid 2008, 36) Similarly, these dreams could never be realized due to the rigorous campaigns of Islamization in the country’s civilian and military institutions, specifically those mandated by General Zia-ul-Haq.

“General Zia’s eleven-year rule was to have the most long-lasting and damaging effect on Pakistani society, one still prevalent today. Zia, who seized power from Bhutto [father of Benazir Bhutto] in a coup in 1977, dealt with Pakistan’s identity crisis by imposing an ideological Islamic state upon the population. Many of today’s problems – the militancy of the religious parties…and the mushrooming of madrassas and extremist groups…took place during Zia’s era.” (Rashid 2008, 37-38)

Subsequent to these policies were an unprescedented rise in Islamic militancy in FATA mainly because of the government’s “attempts to defeat ethno-nationalism among the Pashtuns…by supporting Islamism as a rival ideology. Thus…in the process [the government] helped the rise of militant Islamism which combined with the conservative tribal Pashtun culture.” (6) (Pakistan: Anatomy of the ISI 2008). In the short term, however, these policies were tempting, as they enabled the ISI and the army to indoctrinate the young and uneducated men of FATA and use them as insurgents and suicide bombers (a claim the ISI and Pakistan government have repeatedly denied) in India and/or Afghanistan.

The Taliban and its allies continue to receive assistance from Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex. Some in the West say this assistance is attributable to the Pakistani military’s desire to keep them alive to fight proxy wars against Pakistan’s enemies (India) in the various conflicts throughout Central and South Asia…Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment has a disturbingly large number of ‘true believers’ in its ranks. The origins of their influence date back to General Zia ul Haq’s years as president. As a result of Haq’s policies, Islamists infiltrated the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment’s ranks repeatedly, and still other existing servicemen have adopted their radical views…they long ago committed themselves to the most radical brand of Islam and believe that Pakistan should wage jihad against her enemies to expand her power. (7) (Joscelyn and Roggio 2009)

In the 1990s and through September 11, 2001, when Islamic radicals linked to Al Qaeda had attacked US interests at home and abroad—i.e.the World Trade Center (1993), US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the USS Cole (2000)—the CIA and State Department failed to convince numerous Pakistani governments to halt their support for the Taliban, especially after they refused to hand over Usama Bin Laden. In fact, according to Coll, despite US pressure, some military and ISI offficials proclaimed that “If the Taliban took control of Kabul…Pakistan would have at least achieved General Zia’s dreams.” (2004, 331) President Clinton even placed “…Pakistan on the watch list of state sponsors of terrorism…” (Rashid 2008, 41) for its involvement in and support of the Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri insurgents.

Nevertheless, even after the 9/11 attacks, “It was from there [FATA] that the bomb plots in London, Madrid, Bali, Islamabad, and later Germany and Denmark were planned”, and despite enormous amount of pressure from the United States and the international community, “FATA’s anarchistic status was sustained by the Pakistan army, which could claim that the territory was not accountable to international law.” (Rashid 2008, 265-266)

While “Almost all latter-day Al Qaeda terrorist plots around the world had a FATA connnection” (Rashid 2008, 278) all pieces of evidence point to the Pakistan Army and the ISI as sole protectors of nearly all fundamentalist-terrorist groups operating in FATA. These are the parties most responsible for turning FATA into a hotbed of Islamic militancy and a base for global jihad where the most dangerous and radical Islamic groups have found sanctuary and bases of operation.

Unfortunately, the same policies continue to dominate Pakistan’s national and international politics i.e. in regards to India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Pakistan has not made any adjustments to its policies since the 1970s, despite the dramatic global changes that came with the end of the Cold War. Today, India has evolved into one of the strongest trade and economic partners to the United States, even though Delhi’s traditional Cold War ally was always the Soviet Union. Pakistan has yet to adapt in almost every way.

Moreover, while America and its allies encouraged the rise of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and FATA during 1970s and 1980s to counter the growing influence of the fomer Soviet Union in the South and Central Asia, today the United States, Russia and even China are struggling with their own threats of Islamic militancy and terrorism—originating inside and outside their respective borders. Therefore, by pursuing the age-old policies of Islamization, Pakistan could very well alienate all of the major economic and political powers and risk losing the support of all of its traditional and potential allies. Pakistan would do well to realize that its territory as base for global jihad is not the only way to attract the attention of major powers and stay relevent on the world stage.

Instead, Pakistan could gain enormous economic and political leverage by promoting peace and stability, by being a responsible and reliable partner in the areas of trade and economics to its neighbors, and by pursuing its national interests within the stablished international framework. Through that, the country will build a strong economy and healthy institutions that can compete with the rising powers nearby. Otherwise, while the Paksitani government is busy managing the militants it supports and cleaning the mess they create, India is widening its already-large margins of military and economic supremacy—and without compromising its democratization efforts, no less.

A stable and progressive FATA, on the other hand, will enable Pakistan to promote trade with Afghanistan and Central Asian countries that will boost its shattered economy, build trust at home and abroad, and attract major international investment. At this time however, with FATA in the state of peril and the government on the verge of collapse, neither America nor the rest of the world know what the future holds for Pakistan.

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1. Markey, Daniel. Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt. Council Special Report No. 36, Center for Preventive Action, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, August, 2008.

2. "Understanding FATA." understandingfata.org. 2008. http://www.understandingfata.org/about%20fata.html (accessed November 05, 2009).

3. Rashid, Ahmad. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking Penguin, 2008.

4. "Pakistan: A New Phase In Militant Proxy Saga." www.stratfor.com. April 28, 2008. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/pakistan_new_phase_militant_proxy_saga (accessed November 8, 2009).

5. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History Of The CIA, Afghanistan, And Bin Laden, From The Soviet Invasion To September 10, 2001 . New York: Penguin Group, 2004.

6. "Pakistan: Anatomy of the ISI." www.stratfor.com. August 11, 2008. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/pakistan_anatomy_isi (accessed November 5, 2009).

7. Joscelyn, Thomas, and Bill Roggio. "Analysis: Al Qaeda is the tip of the jihadist spear." The Long War Journal. October 8, 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_al_qaeda_is.php (accessed November 01, 2009).

Afghanistan: The Battlefield of Empires

2009-11-30T08:18:00.000-08:00

Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the Americans have been reminded over and over that if history is any indicator, America has no chance of winning the current war mainly because of Afghanistan’s xenophobic and militaristic culture combined with the rough terrain of the country. In the words of Ahmad Rashid, “since the first American bombs fell on Afghanistan in October 2001, a cottage industry of doomsayers has arisen among academics and journalists, warning that the US will fail in the so-called ‘graveyard of empires’ just as the Soviets did.”[i] et al (Rashid, Graveyard of Analogies 2009) Nevertheless, the analysis coming out of the circles Rashid mentions is misguided.

Afghanistan has been a quintessential victim of its location —a magnet for super-powers and conquerors for millennia. As a result, the Afghan people have come to view their own occupation by foreigners as part of a cycle that will certainly pass and give way for the next phase. The fickle resolve of countless occupiers coupled with internal frictions and rivalries among tribes and ethnic groups have robbed Afghans of any real sense of stability and civic obligation toward their country, making them inevitably susceptible to exploitation by foreign influence.

Unfortunately, the pessimism integral to such history lessons about Afghanistan ignore many subtle details that point in another direction. More specifically, many observers draw a parallel between the current situation and the Russian occupation of Afghanistan during 1980s, insisting that America is going down the same path and is doomed to fail miserably. Granted, the Soviet army certainly failed because it was “overwhelmed by adverse conditions in Afghanistan that drained troop morale, relied on massive firepower to kill and maim Afghans,” and failed to counter the reality that the Afghan mujahideen [anti-soviet holy warriors] “maintained their sanctuaries in Pakistan, where they were rearmed and funded by the CIA.” (Rashid, Graveyard of Analogies 2009)

Moreover, it was America’s rigorous anti-Soviet campaign and millions of dollars in funds that rallied support for the mujahideen and paved the way for Russia’s defeat in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the weakening Soviet economy and Mikhail Gorbachev’s strong desires for reform translated into a strengthening of diplomacy with the US and subsequent withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. It is no coincidence, for example, that the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan coincided with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the communist regime shortly thereafter. The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was merely a sign of a declining communist regime in Russia and the beginning of a new world order, not a defeat by any traditional military standard (in the hands of Afghans).

What, then, is the biggest challenge for American and NATO forces in Afghanistan today? To answer this question, one must turn to the neighboring country, Pakistan, where policy-makers firmly believe that Afghanistan provides Pakistan with “strategic depth” [ii] (Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia 2008, 268) and that only a friendly regime in Kabul under the leadership of the Taliban can guarantee such depth for Pakistan. Even today, some elements within the Pakistani government allegedly continue to protect and support the Afghan Taliban.

…there is a hardened core within Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment – in particular, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency - that is dedicated to jihad and sponsors al Qaeda’s allies [the Afghan Taliban]…we should never forget that Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – the commanders of the Afghan insurgency – were all originally ISI proxies and, to some degree, remain so today. Parts of the ISI have also worked with al Qaeda proper for years as well.[iii] et al (Joscelyn and Roggio 2009)

Despite American pressure (and billions of dollars in civilian and military aide) to halt support for various militant and insurgent groups, the Pakistani government has never made a firm commitment to eradicate or dismantle the Afghan Taliban and other extremist networks operating openly from within Pakistani cities.

Undoubtedly, America has received vital assistance from Pakistan’s government in the post-9/11 world… But Pakistan’s government is both divided and duplicitous. In particular, key figures within Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment have continued to play a double-game….the Taliban would not be able to prosper in Quetta, Pakistan, if it were not for the intelligence service’s hospitality. The Taliban and its allies continue to receive assistance from Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex. Some in the West say this assistance is attributable to the Pakistani military’s desire to keep them alive to fight proxy wars against Pakistan’s enemies (India) in the various conflicts throughout Central and South Asia. There is undoubtedly much truth in this. This is probably an apt explanation for why military leaders like General Musharraf, who is no jihadist, supported the Taliban in the first place. (Joscelyn and Roggio 2009)

However, the abundance of damning evidence has not brought any plausible policy change in regards to Pakistan. Pakistani officials have almost always succeeded in assuring American policy-makers of their commitment to their alliance with the US by taking one step forward publically but two steps back covertly. Meanwhile, even the American officials who recognize Pakistan’s duplicity still have faith that Pakistan will eventually come around, and such wishful thinking has precluded Washington from recognizing that America is essentially at war with its own ally, Pakistan.

Accordingly, the current war in Afghanistan is fueled, supported and pre-determined by a Pakistani government in pursuit of its own strategic and national security matters. The Afghan Taliban, however, are merely an instrument of Pakistani strategy – their rubber gloves – who are trained, armed, and protected by Islamabad. After being deployed across the border to fight American and international forces, they are given sanctuary in Pakistan’s frontiers until the next deployment.

Thus, all the facts on the ground prove that Afghanistan has merely been a graveyard of empires only by virtue of its status as a battlefield of empires, where armies inevitably despair and fail. The past three decades of war have destroyed Afghanistan’s social fabric, its governmental and civic institutions, and even its already-limited basic infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, the majority of Afghans are tired of war and tyranny. America on the other hand, has every tool at its disposal to win this war, if only it acknowledges and denounces the real enemy in Pakistan and prevents it from recruiting fighters in Afghanistan. Pouring billions of dollars into Pakistan’s coffers on the basis of shabby promises will continue to fund questionable military and intelligence endeavors that come back to haunt Washington. Ultimately, while it was America’s commitment and support of the anti Soviet resistance in Afghanistan that kept the movement alive during 1980, it will be Pakistan’s duplicity and America’s inaction that will ruin America’s prospects for success in Afghanistan today.

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[i] Rashid, Ahmad. 2009. "Graveyard of Analogies." The National. January 30. http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090130/REVIEW/458735663/1008 (accessed November 19, 2009).

[ii] Rashid, Ahmad. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking Penguin, 2008.

[iii] Joscelyn, Thomas, and Bill Roggio. "Analysis: Al Qaeda is the tip of the jihadist spear." The Long War Journal. October 8, 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_al_qaeda_is.php (accessed November 01, 2009).

The Multiple Dimensions of the Afghan Conflict

2009-10-31T14:35:00.000-07:00

Recently, the war in Afghanistan has been getting an unprecedented amount of attention from every possible media outlet as President Obama and his advisors (along with an array of congressional delegates and experts) weigh their options in Afghanistan and the broader region. However, much of the assessments and analysis are crafted to present the conflict between the West and Al Qaeda, leaving large and crucial aspects of the conflict unattended.

Naturally, paramount to any successful war strategy is an understanding of the political culture, demography, history, and social landscape of one’s adversary. Therefore, to ensure short and long term success, every strategy, goal and tactic in Afghanistan must be tailored to accommodate and account for these factors. In other words, the means will most certainly determine the duration, cost and results necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

This is not in any way to suggest that we discard the ideals of establishing a truly democratic government (or perhaps a pro American government), protecting human rights, and laying the foundation for a modern and robust economy in Afghanistan. However, gaining the trust and affection of the people is the first step in a long journey. Unfortunately, much of the political and strategic failure in Afghanistan can be attributed to a lack of in-depth understanding of the country and its position among its Asian neighbors.

Furthermore, applying western political and cultural concepts in the current war in Afghanistan will undermine any effort to improve the situation there and ensure that the American military and NATO forces are tied down in a war with a questionable future. Therefore, this series will include an overview of how Afghans perceive the causes and effects of the enduring conflicts in Afghanistan over the last three decades, and the roles played by neighboring countries, both directly and indirectly.

Afghanistan

“…Afghanistan, which was the nodal point between the civilizations of India, East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and thence Europe…” et al (Tanner 2002), is a landlocked and mountainous country, and host to a variety of ethnic minorities with little or no interaction among them—mostly due to the rough terrain, prolonged war and poverty. Yet despite this relative isolation, each of these ethnic groups are loyal to their respective brethren in neighboring countries, with whom they share a common linguistic, historical, and cultural heritage.

In part, this phenomenon combined with the geography of the country, create a sense of identity crisis among the people and even within the government of Afghanistan. The country is on the margins of every regional economic and political forum solely because its disparate geography precludes any legitimacy the country might acquire and, as a result, neither the Afghan nor regional governments can determine the loyalty of Afghanistan and the Afghan people.
Beginning with the creation of modern-day Afghanistan in 1747 by the Durrani tribes, Afghan governments have always pursued policies to ensure the dominance of Pashtuns over other groups.
As a result, Pashtuns have always enjoyed a disproportionate amount of power and representation in the government while the rest of the population has been alienated and their protests vis-à-vis their conditions were cruelly suppressed throughout the centuries.

Dwelling mostly in the eastern and southern areas of the country, Pashtuns are divided into hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes that are ruled by tribal chiefs/elders and governed by Pashtunwali—both a code of personal conduct and an unofficial method of dispute resolution between and among tribes.

The dearth of valuable natural resources and access to water has produced an environment and culture conducive to inter-tribal rivalry, conflict, and militarism for centuries. In the words of Stephen Tanner’s Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander The Great To The Fall Of The Taliban: “…its terrain facilitated the ability of tribes to exist independently among inaccessible mountains, in veritable isolation from the writ of a central government terrain provided no such difficulties for tribes to descend from their heights to participate in collective defense.” (p. 123)

Furthermore, the lack of natural resources and consequent poverty has long compelled these tribesmen to find other means of income, historically by extorting road/highway tolls from passing convoys. “The Ghilzais [Pashtun tribes] had been paid for the rental of their prized possessions – the passes to India - for centuries…” (p. 157) says Tanner, recounting the experience of the local British troops in the 19th century.

Nonetheless, Pashtun culture and society never had the opportunity to evolve due to incessant political turmoil in the region and, more recently, the Russian occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. After much deliberation by the United States and Pakistani governments, the Pashtun tribal lands were chosen as an incubator for anti-Soviet resistance, primarily due to its close proximity to Pakistan (an American Cold War ally) and ripe location along the expanding perimeter of the Soviet Union.

While Pashtuns dominated the communist government in Kabul, their ancestral homes in southern and eastern Afghanistan were surging with new military training camps, madrassas (religious schools) and an unprecedented influx of foreign (mostly Muslim and Arab) volunteers to join the anti-Soviet jihad.

Consequently, the robust campaign of Islamization of the region (supported by the United States, Pakistan, and some Gulf States during 1980s) intent on defeating the “godless” Soviets ultimately sowed the seeds of religious fundamentalism and insurgency among tribesmen and produced an entire generation of uneducated, isolated, and religiously fundamentalist Pashtuns. In addition, it was during this period that the Pakistani government and its intelligence wing, the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), established roots in these communities to satisfy other ambitions that the Pakistani government had set forward [will be explored and elaborated further in later sections].

Meanwhile areas outside the south and east of Afghanistan also underwent a transformation in the opposite direction. The Russians heavily invested in securing northern and northwestern provinces in Afghanistan in order to keep the Islamic resistance away from its Central Asian republics and to ensure the steady flow of military supplies and personnel to the communist regime in Kabul. As a result of these policies and in complete contrast with what was taking place in the south and eastern provinces, the northern and northwestern cities were undergoing swift social transformation, becoming more liberal and lenient, and benefiting from a rapid increase in the number of schools for Afghans of all ages and education levels, and even in their most remote villages.

Incidentally, the northern and northwestern provinces are home to Afghanistan’s other ethnic minorities, the largest of which is the Tajik population. Tajiks are Farsi/Persian speaking Afghans who claim to be the sole inheritors of the country, tracing their heritage thousands of years back to Persia’s Zarathushtra. Having produced world-renowned poets and philosophers like Rumi, Tajiks still take great pride in their Persian identity and consider themselves culturally and politically more progressive than other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

In contrast to their Pashtun countrymen, Tajiks are socially moderate, and a large majority of them follow the Sufi sect of Islam. Feeling marginalized and oppressed since they lost power in 1747, they have passively worked with the Pashtuns but never accepted the legitimacy of their monopoly over the country’s government and institutions. For more than two centuries, Pashtuns projected their dominance by resettling thousands of “…Ghilzai [Pashtun] families north of the Hindu Kush in a forced emigrations…” with the goal of “…enhancing the Pashtun influence in the north.” (Tanner 2002). It seemed only inevitable, then, that ethnic and cultural tensions between Tajiks and Pashtuns would only escalate in the years to come.

To be continued...

References:
Tanner, Stephen. 2002. Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander The Great To The Fall Of The Taliban. United States of America: DA CAPO PRESS.

Healthcare in America

2009-09-30T16:05:00.000-07:00

As someone who pays very little attention to domestic politics, it is unusual to be drawn into the current healthcare issue and the debates surrounding it as I have been lately. There are moments filled with optimism and moments that I find myself yelling at my television set saying “what in the world are you thinking!” The fact of the matter is that the issue of healthcare is so broadly manipulated that by the time the healthcare event (of any kind) finishes, no one is talking about the government healthcare bill anymore.

Certainly, what the Obama administration is dealing with in regards to healthcare issue is so much more complex than what the other presidents whom advocated for some sort of government-run healthcare, experienced. Since healthcare has been a major policy issue for decades, no president will make it a pivotal piece of their presidency if not prepared to face one of the fiercest battles of his/her administration. But the battle for President Obama is much more heated than it has ever been.

Ironically, the question of why opposing the current healthcare bill has repeatedly gotten answers such as: “Obama is a fascist” or “I want a Christian in the Whitehouse” (1) which makes one wonder whether the opposition to the healthcare bill really oppose a government-run healthcare or these individuals use the issue to vent their frustrations about other aspects of the government or the president himself.

If the government spending truly is the main concern of the so called the Tea Party (the strongest opposition group), the group should have begun serving tea several years ago – during the Bush administration – when the historically largest budget deficit concurred as a result of the Iraq war. Similarly, I often wonder where these individuals were at the time of President Bush’s proposal of the $700 billion bailout plan (the bill passed later at the beginning of 2009), the bailout of Bear Stearns in April of 2008, the bailout of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, and several more of this kind.

Politics is full of unfulfilled promises, contradictions and hypocrisy and we are all aware of it. That is not what concerns me the most. What concerns me is that a small group of lobbyists and industries are able to manipulate and alter the views of a large and educated population for their own benefit. As apparent in the recent healthcare debates, there is a strong force of distraction and diversion at work to prevent people from thinking the government involvement in the healthcare through by encouraging their disagreements of this administration’s other policies.

Personally, I have an unquestionable commitment and respect for hard work and self-reliance and believe in free market economy and selected government involvement in social and economic affairs of a nation. Nevertheless, I also believe that a wealthy government/nation such as the United States has a moral obligation to care for its weakest and most vulnerable members at least through providing basic healthcare coverage and in order to ensure a strong and healthy populace. As a result, a strong, healthy, and educated population in return, will guarantee the strength of America’s national security, economic superiority, and its position as a global hegemon for many generations to come. Therefore, providing all Americans access to healthcare is the best and most profitable (non-monetary) investment the government can make and the sooner it sows the seeds the faster it will reap the fruit.

1. Taxpayer Tea Party. September 12, 2009. DC TEA PARTY - MARCH FOOTAGE WITH INTERVIEWS. Retrieved September 25, 2009 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUPMjC9mq5Y

It Is Time for Everyone to Pull Their Weight

2009-09-18T13:01:00.000-07:00

The war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan is entering its ninth year and has been extremely costly for the United States both in terms of manpower and finances. Nonetheless, Al Qaeda is still operational from its original (prewar) bases and the Taliban is stronger than they were at the beginning of the war and continues to bring more Afghan towns and villages under its control.

In the domestic front, the support of the American public for the war is waning and people are skeptical whether a complete victory—by any definition—is attainable. However, some argue that, given Afghanistan’s geopolitical dynamics, it is too early to speak about victory and end of the mission, and if we want to win this war, we need to be willing to make a long term commitment regardless of circumstances at home or elsewhere.

Both of these scenarios are legitimately worthy of concern, but there are great risks involved with both of the approaches. Premature pullout of forces can have devastating consequences as the Taliban and Al Qaeda are ready to fill the power vacuum. A long term commitment to Afghanistan however, would require a great deal of resources and will bar America from effectively managing its affairs with the rest of the world.

When dealing with complex and deeply rooted conflicts, one way to ensure success is to be open to creating unusual and sometimes, unpleasant alliances and partnerships. Therefore, to guarantee a complete victory, the US must be willing to rally support from regional powers whose national security are threatened by Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and share the burden of the “war on terrorism” with them.

There are several reasons why more countries/governments should share the cost of the war in Afghanistan with the US and NATO forces and we will briefly examine each one: Take the agenda and the vision of Al Qaeda for instance. The network is a collection of Salafi-Takfiri jihadists whose mission is to establish strict form of Sunni Islam first in the current Islamic states and then turn to the rest of the world.

Salafism is a very conservative offshoot of Sunni Islam and does not necessarily endorse armed struggle against nonbelievers. However, the Takfiri (comes from the word Kufr which means nonbeliever in Arabic) branch believes in armed struggle and jihad (holy war) and establishing the Sharia law and Islamic caliphate by overthrowing the regimes that rule Muslims but don’t follow Salafi-Takfiri doctrine. As their long term goal, they consider it their moral duty to overthrow non-Islamic governments in order to establish more Islamic states and convert non-Muslims to Islam.

Therefore, if Al Qaeda is based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, then several countries such as Russia, China, and Iran are in more immediate danger than are the United States and Western European countries. Prior to 9/11, when the Taliban was in power in Afghanistan, all three of the stated countries had allocated considerable amounts of resources to seal their borders to ensure the containment of the Taliban and Al Qaeda inside Afghanistan. But circumstances changed and America came to their rescue and since then shouldering much of the expenses.

Consider the case of Russia and the former Soviet republics after the fall of the Soviet Union: The spread of radical Islam within Russia and Central Asian countries during 1990s was mainly facilitated by Al Qaeda affiliates like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Chechen Islamists and Al Qaeda inspired cells, many of whom had fought against Russians during 1980s and 90s, had received training in Al Qaeda training camps, and still maintain bases in Afghanistan and North-West Pakistan.

IMU fighters and operatives have close ties with Al Qaeda and the Taliban and their ideology is closely aligned with that of Al Qaeda (global jihad and establishment of caliphate). Similarly, Chechen separatists are allegedly Al Qaeda affiliated movement whose aim is to gain independence from Russia and institute a strict form of Islam in Chechnya and broader region.

Furthermore, the unrest in China’s Xinjiang province and more specifically, the grievances of Uighur ethnic minority living there could potentially turn into a full-fledged insurgency if 1) Chinese government does not improve the economic conditions of the province and 2) if Al Qaeda and other radical movements and groups continue to operate in the neighboring countries.

During recent clashes of Uighurs with Chinese government, Al Qaeda was quick to respond, calling for “strikes against Chinese interests in North Africa.” (1) As a matter of fact, an oppressed minority group determined to change the fate of their community and desperate for resources and manpower – as is in the case of Uighurs – could be the next target of Al Qaeda for potential bases of operation as the US drones are finding their way inside the Taliban and Al Qaeda caves.

By the same token, Iran has more at stake when it comes to Al Qaeda and the Taliban than many other countries, regionally and internationally. Ideologically, Al Qaeda opposes the Shi’a sect of Islam as much as, if not more than, Christianity and Judaism, for example. Iran supported Anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan for years prior to 9/11 and assisted the US with war efforts in Afghanistan, at least in its initial stages. Iran considers Al Qaeda a threat to the Islamic Republic’s philosophy and principles and understands the fallouts of leaving Al Qaeda unchallenged.

To sum up, the examples mentioned are merely a fraction of the threats posed by Al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists to Afghanistan's immediate neighbors. Russia, China, and Iran are all rising economies and highly ambitious, and each one of them puts a lot of effort to exert power and influence in their respective regions of interest.

However, before going too far with their ambitions elsewhere or putting conditions and restrictions on how the US fights the war with Al Qaeda and which military base it can or can not use, they should start pulling their weight in their homes and neighborhoods and cleanse them from the cancer of militancy and global terrorism.

An important element of the American domestic politics is public sentiment and as more Americans die and public pressure mounts, the government might begin to shift its strategy of the war in Afghanistan and perhaps pullout the combat forces entirely. If and when that happens, the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban becomes a Russian, Chinese, or Iranian war – a nightmare none of these countries want to experience.

Therefore, the best course of action for these three countries is to assist the United States and NATO forces in their mission in Afghanistan with every possible mean. A multilateral approach will certainly boost public support and confidence for the war on one hand and encircle Al Qaeda and its affiliates on the other and consequently guarantee their defeat in shorter period of time.

1- Algeria, China: Al Qaeda Threatens Beijing’s Interests. July 14, 2009. Strategic Forcasting www.stratfor.com . http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090714_algeria_china_al_qaeda_threatens_beijings_interests/?utm_source=General_Analysis&utm_campaign=none&utm_medium=email

The regional implications of Baitullah Mesud’s death

2009-09-09T09:03:00.000-07:00

On August 5th Pakistan celebrated the elimination of one of its murderous Taliban leaders in the tribal Pashtun belt, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Tahrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP), who was killed as a result of a US drone missile strike.

The event was portrayed as a breakthrough in the war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda by many observers and media outlets especially because of the fact that it ignited a flurry of infighting among Taliban over succession of Baitullah. Some even believed that this might be the beginning of the end of the Taliban in the region.

Nonetheless, the issue of Taliban has been poorly understood since the core of the problem has been widely misrepresented. The term Taliban has evolved to include radical Muslim groups and organizations mostly situated in South and Eastern Afghanistan and North-West regions of Pakistan. Some of these groups have globalized views of jihad and Islamization (aligned with Al-Qaeda’s philosophy) and others are primarily nationalists with Islamic pretext.

Although an acquaintance of Al Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud represented the latter mainly targeting Pakistan Military and government personnel and establishments. Pashtun tribesmen like Baitullah Mehsud on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line (1) feel marginalized in Pakistan society as a result of government policies of negligence that has kept the region sterile, while the economy of Pakistan proper has been growing at a steady rate annually for the past few decades. Therefore, the Pakistani Taliban's main target at this time is the Pakistan Government installations and Army.

Ironically, in order to curb India’s influence in the region, Pakistan Army and Intelligence Services have invested heavily on harvesting and training Islamist militants including the Taliban and other terrorist groups primarily in the North-West and Kashmir regions of the country. The preoccupation with regards to war with India has become so ingrained in the psyche of Pakistani Army and Intelligence Community that the long term threats that the Islamic militancy poses for Pakistan and the region are entirely dismissed.

However, lately the Government has declared the Pakistani Taliban as “bad Taliban” and the Afghan Taliban “good Taliban” solely because of the goals and agenda that each of these groups pursue. As Pakistan’s brainchild, the Taliban government in Kabul was first recognized by Pakistani Government who meanwhile tirelessly lobbied the Clinton administration, the State Department, and the UN for the recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. However, September 11 Al-Qaeda attacks on American soil changed these policies at least in the surface.

Fearing an eminent American retaliation, the Pakistan government under Gen. Pervez Musharraf abandoned the Taliban regime but to some degree maintained behind the scene ties with them. But, as America’s attention shifted toward Iraq, the Pakistan Government expanded its support of the Afghan Taliban (although Pakistani governments and Army have always denied it)by providing their leadership sanctuary in the city of Quetta, Pakistan and allegedly helped them regroup in later years.

Relations with Afghanistan is a matter of national security for Pakistan as the country will be surrounded by hostile governments from more than one direction if a strong and self-determined government emerges in Afghanistan with Indian alliance.
Therefore, keeping the Taliban insurgency alive in Afghanistan ensures Pakistan a foothold in the country in the case of US and NATO withdrawal.

However, this policy doesn’t apply to the Pakistani Taliban, including Mehsud and others. The Pakistani Taliban fight against their “near-enemy” the Pakistan government and has been responsible for countless number of suicide attacks that claimed the lives of many Pakistani civilians and even one national leader, Benazir Bhutto in December of 2007.

Consequently, the death of Baitullah Mehsud and the infighting among Pakistani Taliban will have little or no effect on war in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been accused of supporting and sheltering Taliban leaders and operatives and will probably continue to do so as long as the threat from India remains constant. However, it’s unclear how the new leader of TTP, Hakeemullah Mehsud will lead the organization. There has already been a major suicide attack in one of the Pakistani checkpoints in the border with Afghanistan after his appointment.

1. Named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British Indian government who demarcated the border between Afghanistan and then British India in 1893

The Case of Al-Megrahi

2009-08-30T11:21:00.000-07:00

On August 20th while Americans and British were outraged by the release of Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi, the Libyan convicted of terrorism charges in connection with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the people of Switzerland had their own share of dilemma to deal with. Hans-Rudolf Merz, The President of Switzerland, arrived in Tripoli to offer his personal apologies for arresting Moammar Gadhafi’s son and his wife in 2008 while they were vacationing in Switzerland. The people in the United States and Europe have openly criticized their governments for going too far to appease a dictator who is allegedly responsible for the death of countless number of innocent American and European nationals.
However, while the complaints and uproar of people is certainly explicable, many fail to realize that Europe has much larger problems than anyone can realize. For a long time especially since Russian-Ukrainian conflict of winter 2008 that left many European countries in short supply of gas, Europeans have tirelessly been looking for ways to reduce their energy dependence on Russia. Although there are other countries that could fill in the vacuum, Libya seems like a cheaper partner at least for the short term. The country has the means, infrastructure and relative stability to ensure the flow of energy to Europe and specifically to United Kingdom and Switzerland.
Consequently, UK and Switzerland prefer to swallow their pride and go along with Gadhafi’s offer then dealing with Russians and their sphere of influence all together. It’s still unclear whether Libya’s payback will be worth taking an enormous public relations risk such as with the case of Al-Megrahi but the policy of tit-for-tats is obviously a better options than the alternatives.